At a time when the first Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru – the architect of modern India - is subjected to unabashed campaign of calumny by the right-wing regime, headed by Narendra Modi, it is imperative to remind ourselves how his foreign policy of non-alignment had not only raised his moral stature world-wide, but also the moral high ground that India occupied in the community of nations, unmatched in history.

While Nehru's decision to opt for democracy in India with universal adult franchise all at once, despite massive poverty, illiteracy, and extreme backwardness, was a historical exception, his pursuit of the policy of non-alignment during the Cold War between the two hostile camps, which defused many international crises, was also unique in itself.

This author's doctoral thesis, "Jawaharlal Nehru: His Contribution to World Peace," was published as a book titled "Nehru and World Peace." The contents of this piece are primarily based on a chapter, "Nehru-Menon Symbiosis: Mediation in Global Crises," in the book. It serves as a reminder of the importance of mediation by a neutral, impartial umpire in resolving internal conflicts.

Pandit Nehru believed that all differences could be resolved peacefully through negotiations, if only nations were willing to discuss their differences that result in conflicts. However, talks between the warring factions are not possible when they do not see eye-to-eye on disputes that affect them. In such a situation, mediation by a third party can bring the warring groups together and help resolve the conflicts between them, provided the third party plays the role of an honest broker to defuse tensions and promote peace.

This is what characterised Nehru's foreign policy of non-alignment, which acted as a go-between for the warring groups during the height of the Cold War, nd particularly in the Korean War. In this role of mediation in international disputes, Nehru found the right person in VK Krishna Menon. He was a trusted lieutenant of Nehru. Menon interpreted and applied Nehru's philosophy and ideas to international politics. It is doubtful whether Nehru's foreign policy of non-alignment would have been so effective and received laurels had there been no Menon to interpret and apply 'Nehruism' on a global scale. No Indian, other than Menon, could match Nehru's intellect and the grasp of world events. Like Nehru, Menon also had a keen interest in world affairs.

Menon played a significant role in mediating international crises, such as the Korean War of 1950, the Indo-China Conflict of 1954, the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Congo-UN crisis of 1960, among others, which had the potential to escalate into a world war. Like Nehru, Menon was eager to project India to the world as a country that sincerely believed in easing tensions to create a climate of peace. Menon's "shuttle diplomacy" was as unique as the Nehru-Menon symbiosis. They introduced a novel device of mediation in international diplomacy and made it an effective instrument of peace. This earned India international laurels, and her moral stature rose high.

The outbreak of war in Korea on June 25, 1950, put Nehru's policy of non-alignment to the test. The Korean War was a manifestation of Cold War politics. The war between the two Koreas had the potential of turning into a global war with the direct participation of the two power blocs. And when the Soviet Union withdrew from the Security Council for its refusal to replace representatives of Chiang Kai-shek by representatives of Red China, the UN Security Council passed a resolution accusing North Korea of aggression. The resolution authorised the US to enforce necessary sanctions. Consequently, President Truman dispatched the American troops in support of South Korea.

Nehru wrote letters to Stalin and Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, on July 13 and 15, respectively, pleading for an end to the war. He proposed the admission of Red China into the UN as a step towards ending the Korean War. He wanted to localise the conflict and facilitate an early, peaceful settlement. His proposal that China should be admitted into the UN and that North Korea be given a hearing was accepted by Stalin. The US rejected the proposal. However, the West felt that "Pandit Nehru exerting a restraining influence on China had alone more than anything else to prevent the Korean conflict from involving the world," and that "he is the counterweight on the democratic side to Mao Tse-tung on the communist side."

KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking at the time, had become a prominent diplomat, serving as a liaison between the Chinese authorities and the Government of India, on the one hand, and China and the West, on the other. On the midnight of October 2, 1950, Zhou Enlai summoned Panikkar to convey that "if the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel China would be forced to intervene in Korea ... American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance." Panikkar telegraphically dispatched the gist of the conversation to Prime Minister Nehru the very night. Nehru conveyed Zhou Enlai's threat of intervention to Acheson, who paid no attention and dismissed it. And General MacArthur, the US chief of staff, crossed the 38th Parallel to bring about the unification of Korea. The war broke out.

America suffered heavy casualties in North Korea at the hands of the Chinese army. The US contemplated retaliatory measures: a naval blockade of China and the bombing of Chinese airfields. The US State Department asked its allies to declare China as an aggressor, to impose an economic embargo and to cut off diplomatic relations with Red China.

In January 1951, Nehru was in London attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. He proposed to convene a conference on Korea. Panikkar was interpreting his proposals to Chinese authorities, who frequently called on him. In Paris, Nehru had three rounds of conferences with Indian diplomats and diplomatic chiefs in European capitals. He had discussions with the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie and the French President and Prime Minister. He also discussed the Korean question with world leaders attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. And cables were exchanged between India House, the Kremlin and Peking. Consequently, India's ability to exercise a sobering influence on China and the Soviet Union had increased.

Nehru, in his letter to Zhou Enlai dated January 23, 1952, was pleading moderation on the part of China: "The occasion demands the highest statesmanship which by its vision and generosity will upset the forces making for war and give to Asia not only peace and strength but also a moral leadership. The new China is in a position today to provide such a far-sighted and generous lead for peace, which can result in the immediate removal of tension and fear from the world. We in India and China have suffered enough humiliation in the past and have resented it and fought against it."
The question of the exchange of prisoners of war had become a thorny issue, defying solution, to the cessation of hostilities in Korea, a stumbling block to the armistice agreement. While POWs expressed their wish against repatriation, China and North Korea insisted that all POWs should be repatriated, whether they liked it or not. Menon met privately with both the communist and the Western delegations. He carried on man-to-man conversations.

After a month of intensive, feverish activity, India moved a resolution in the seventh session of the General Assembly that contained the proposal Nehru had made earlier: that prisoners should be repatriated under the supervision of a Neutral Repatriation Commission. Nehru warned that if India's proposals were not accepted, then the world would be taking a step towards another great war. The resolution was accepted by both sides, paving the way for the signing of the armistice agreement.

Thus, the politics of the Cold War contributed to the success of Indian diplomacy. India assumed the chairmanship of the Neutral National Repatriation Commission. India assumed the custody of around 33,000 POWs from the UN Command and 360 from the Command of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers. The prisoners were repatriated at will without any force or threat of force. India provided a custodial force of some 6,000.

President Eisenhower, in his letter to Prime Minister Nehru dated February 19, 1953, wrote: "I want to express to you my appreciation and that of my countrymen for the performance of the Indian Custodial Forces. No military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate and demanding peace time mission that faced by the Indian forces in Korea. The vast majority of prisoners placed in their charge had from months of imprisonment and uncertainty become highly nervous and volatile. The confidence inspired by the exemplary tact, fairness and firmness shown by the Indian officials and men led by their two able commanders Lieutenant General Thimayya and Major General Thorat did much to alleviate the fears and doubts of these prisoners. They deserve the highest commendation."

Nehru echoed the feelings of his countrymen when he made a statement in the Lok Sabha on December 24: "We went to Korea because if we had not gone, there would have been no truce and no ceasefire and the war would have gone on with the danger of its extension."

Prime Minister Nehru, just three years into independence, was acknowledged as a doyen of world statesmen, with his moral authority reverberating across the world. Bertrand Russell paid tribute to him for having insisted that India should be non-aligned in the struggle for power between the two lunatic camps post-World War II: "Faced with overwhelming difficulties and pressure, Nehru insisted upon the role of mediator where he could have secured financial and military aid from whichever side he might have chosen to use. This decision was responsible for the possibility of a third force of neutral and non-aligned nations and, as such, may be a decisive factor in the survival of humanity."

He acquired such international respect and prestige that he was proposed for the chancellorship of the University of Cambridge. As mentioned in S. Gopal's "Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography," some 89 members of the University Senate, including Lord Bertrand Russell, EM Forster, RA Butler, Pathic Lawrence, and Lord Mountbatten, formally nominated Prime Minister Nehru as a candidate for the chancellorship in 1950, when the incumbent, Jan Smuts, died, without giving him an opportunity to withdraw. The official candidate was Lord Tedder. The reasons they gave for nominating an outsider to the prestigious position in an iconic, renowned, world-class 800-year-old University were very striking:

"The Prime Minister of India is ... incontestably the most eminent ... Pandit Nehru, as Prime Minister of India, has it in his power to offer to a world distracted by hatred and prejudice services incomparably more valuable and more pacific than lie within the grasp of any other Cambridge man at this time. We ask members of the University to offer to Pandit Nehru ... the Office of Chancellor as a mark of admiration of his qualities of character and of intellect and as a sign of our hope for and trust in that peaceful reconciliation of the different races, and creeds of mankind."

Pandit Nehru persuaded his supporters not to press for the nomination as he did not want to embarrass the British Government by contesting the chancellorship against their official nominee. His supporters in Cambridge were reluctant to agree to his withdrawing his candidature, arguing that they had the right to elect whom they wished. Menon managed to persuade them.

However, since Nehru's candidature was withdrawn after the last date for withdrawal, the election had to proceed with only one candidate. The election was held on November 10, 1950, and Lord Tedder was declared elected, much to the dismay of Nehru's supporters. So, Pandit Nehru almost became the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge.