Fr. Gaurav Nair
A growing perception—amplified by social media and public commentary—is that the judiciary has been thoroughly infiltrated by Hindutva agents, much like the saffron-hued malefactors propose that Bangladeshis have, and been ideologically compromised. Some recent Supreme Court verdicts, rather than being unbiased and just, seem to lend credence to such calumny.
Even though the State was caught lying, relying on a discredited witness, and had not yet produced any physical evidence, the Supreme Court refused bail to Muslim activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, who have been jailed without trial for over five years in what the police call the larger conspiracy case of the Delhi riots.
The Supreme Court judgment is fundamentally flawed even when tested against basic common sense. In accepting the prosecution's assertion that the duo were prima facie involved in the riots and were "on a qualitatively different footing" from the other accused, the Court seems to be using a fallacious hierarchy of participation as the basis to relieve all but two people. This is unfair when the evidence to establish it has not yet been tested. The situation lacks any sound jurisprudence and is only based on prejudice.
The UAPA, under which Umar and Sharjeel are incarcerated, itself does not provide a rigorous definition of what constitutes terrorism. In a broadly sweeping fashion, it includes "intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror" as indicative of terrorism, which is vague, has a chilling effect, and invites arbitrary application.
If applied consistently, this definition would raise uncomfortable questions about how selectively the law is enforced. Our PM and Home Minister should have been the first recipients, as too many of their speeches have been directly inflammatory, divisive, and a threat to national integrity, economic sovereignty, and national security. In comparison, Umar's and Sharjeel's speeches against the CAA have been critical only of the government's policies. Even more bafflingly, Sharjeel had been in custody for more than six months before the riots in Delhi.
Today, when exponentially more people are disillusioned with the government and are coming to realise the propaganda they have been living under, is the Court setting a precedent that can be used draconially against citizens at the slightest pretext?
The Court's observation that they did not believe "continued detention has crossed the threshold of constitutional impermissibility so as to override the statutory embargo," even after five years, is quite telling. This way of thinking has seismic connotations for other cases that rely on fabricated, dubious, or thin evidence. It also raises questions about the Supreme Court's ability—or willingness—to follow its own more liberal, rights and justice-oriented rulings.